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A Reconsideration of
THE RIGHT TO STRIKE
JAMES GRAHAM*
A DECISION BY the United States Supreme Court in June of 1962 denying
injunctive relief to employers in federal courts against strikes in
breach of collective bargaining agreements may be one of the more signifi-
cant events in the field of labor relations since the passage of the Taft-
Hartley amendments to the National Labor Relations Act in 1947.1
The Sinclair Case
Mr. Justice Black's majority opinion in Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkin-
son2 certainly clashes with the temper of the times and will probably pro-
voke serious proposals for corrective federal legislation. Insofar as the
decision reanimates the statutory language and doctrines of a more turbu-
lent era in labor relations,' it should also generate fresh discussion about
the scope, viability and morality of the so-called "right to strike."
In substance, the Court in Sinclair decided that when Congress amended
the NLRA and gave federal district courts jurisdiction over breach of
contract suits by or against labor organizations, 4 it did not intend to waive
the ban of the Norris-LaGuardia Act which prohibited injunctions "in
any case involving or growing out of any labor dispute." 5 Norris-LaGuar-
dia was enacted ih 1932 as a result of the tendency on the part of many
* A.B., Fordham University; LL.B., St. John's University.
61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1958).
2 370 U.S. 195 (1962). For a discussion of this decision, see 37 ST. JOHN's L. REV.
167 (1962).
3 See Stewart, No-Strike Clauses in Federal Courts, 59 MIcH. L. REV. 673, 676
(1961); Note, 72 HARV. L. REV. 354, 355-56 (1958).
4 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1958).
547 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1958). It should be noted that unions have
been successful in using § 301 to enforce collective bargaining agreements against
their employers. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). The
petitioner thus claimed in Sinclair that since the no-strike clause is the quid pro quo
in consideration of which the employer consents to arbitrate grievance disputes,
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federal judges to enjoin strikes and other
forms of union conduct which disturbed
their private views of order in society.6
Congress, in 1.947 and again in 1959,
clearly had exempted from the effect of
Norris-LaGuardia those amendments to the
NLRA aimed at curbing national emer-
gency strikes and certain unfair labor prac-
tices by unions as, for example, "black-
mail" picketing by a minority union, i.e.,
one that does not represent a majority of
the employees of the picketed employer. 7 A
proposal by the late Senator Robert A.
Taft that any breach of a collective bargain-
ing agreement be deemed an unfair labor
practice and enjoinable by the National
Labor Relations Board passed the Senate
but was removed from the 1947 bill during
a House-Senate Conference.8
As a practical matter, an employer still
has the right in a specific case to a court
order compelling the striking union to arbi-
trate the matter in dispute and the continu-
ation of the strike in the face of such an
order might constitute contempt of court.9
But an employer, without an injunction, has
no advance protection against future strikes
of a similar nature. Absent injunctive relief,
the remedies presently available to an em-
ployer for violation of a "no strike" clause
granting specific performance of the latter would
require the same remedy for the former. See Hoe-
breckx, Federal Courts Under Section 301, 43
MARQ. L. REV. 417, 434 (1960).
6 See Feinsinger, Enforcement of Labor Agree-
mnents- A New Era in Collective Bargaining, 43
VA. L. REV. 1261, 1263 (1957).
7 61 Stat. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 10(h), 208(b)
(1958).
8 Hearings on the Operation of the Labor-Manage-
ment Relations Act Before the Joint Committee
on Labor-Management Relations, 80th Cong., 2d
Sess. 111-12, 114, 239, 241-42 (1947).
O Sinclair v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 217 (1962)
(dissenting opinion); see Note, supra note 3, at
371.
in his contract are generally considered to
be inadequate either as compensation or as
a deterrent. 10 Federal courts may award
money damages in these cases but this re-
lief is small consolation if the respondent
union lacks the funds to satisfy a substan-
tial judgment. Arbitrators and judges, as a
group, are also reluctant to regard unions
as entities apart from their constituent
members who may be earning little more
than the legal minimum wage.
It sometimes happens that strikes are
"wildcat" in origin, unauthorized by the
leadership, or perhaps called in defiance of
the current administration of the union.
The problem then arises, which is unre-
lated to the plight of the employer, of
awarding damages commensurate with
union responsibility for the illegal strike
activity. Furthermore, the strike, though
unlawful, may have been called to protest
misconduct on the part of the employer.
Finally, arbitrators, judges and even em-
ployers must take into consideration the
fact that the course of future labor-man-
agement relations at the struck plant will
not be aided by an oppressive verdict in
money damages.
The Newspaper Blackout
Is it possible, however, for an employer
to take the law into his own hands? May
he, as a defensive measure, retaliate against
an illegal strike with a lockout affecting
neutral employees? In December, 1962 the
five-member NLRB reversed its trial exam-
iner who had concluded, after ahearing,that
the Publishers' Association of New York
City and its member newspapers had vio-
lated the NLRA by maintaining an agree-
10 See Hoebreckx, supra note 5, at 437; Rice, A
Paradox of National Labor Law, 34 MARQ. L.
REV. 233, 234-35 (1951).
ment which contemplated city-wide shut-
downs as a deterrent to illegal strike ac-
tivity.,
Aside from its enormous legal implica-
tions, the Publishers' case is important be-
cause, unlike most Board decisions which
are moot when handed down, this NLRB
determination apparently encouraged the
New York newspapers to blackout the city
when the Typographers' Union struck four
of their members during negotiations only
several weeks after the Board had an-
nounced its decision.
Prior to this decision, the NLRB and the
courts had permitted lockouts, retaliatory
or otherwise, only in very limited circum-
stances, such as a "whipsaw strike" during
contract negotiations,' 2 or when the threat
of an imminent strike presented unusual
economic hardship to an employer. 13 A re-
cent instance of "whipsawing" occurred in
1 The Publishers' Ass'n of New York City, 4 CCH
LAB. L. RFP. (LAB. REL.) (CCH N.L.R.B.) 11776
(Nov. 21, 1962).
12 NLRB v. Truck Drivers' Local 449, Teamsters
Union, 353 U.S. 87 (1957) (Buffalo Linen Supply
Co.). In NLRB v. Great Falls Employers' Council,
Inc., 277 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1960), a union struck
only one of the members of an employers' associ-
ation and the remaining employers locked out their
employees. Subsequently the employees were per-
mitted to work only a part of each week so as to
be disqualified from receiving unemployment com-
pensation. This was held not to be an unfair labor
practice.
13 "[T]he Board has held that in single-employer
cases lockouts cannot be used as a weapon against
a union; they may only be used to protect against
economic loss." Teamsters Union v. NLRB, 262
F-.2d 456, 463 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1958). In American
Brake Shoe Co. v. NLRB, 244 F.2d 489 (7th Cir.
1957), an employer was permitted to utilize lock-
out procedure just before the strike occurred where
economic necessity for such action could be
shown. See, e.g., Betts Cadillac Oldes, Inc., 96
N.L.R.B. 268 (1951); International Shoe Co., 93
N.L.R.B. 907 (1951); Duluth Bottling Ass'n, 48
N.L.R.B. 1335, 1354-60 (1943).
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June 1960 when Actors' Equity precipi-
tated a thirteen-day shutdown of Broad-
way's legitimate theaters by threatening to
strike seriatim the more recalcitrant mem-
bers of the League of New York Theaters.
The Supreme Court, in Buffalo Linen
Supply, reasoned that multi-employer bar-
gaining in this country had developed as a
necessary response to the growth of large,
powerful unions and that members of an
employer association reasonably could pro-
tect the integrity of their bargaining unit
against the threat of disintegration implicit
in a whipsaw strike." The Court in Buffalo
Linen Supply declined to pass upon the
question whether a lockout might be
equated with the right to strikes although
in a somewhat converse situation the Court
affirmed what loosely may be described as
a national policy of non-interference by the
government with the substance of collective
bargaining, by deciding that harassing tac-
tics, such as shutdowns, by a union during
the course of negotiations did not consitute
bad faith bargaining in violation of the
NLRA." s Congress, indicated the Court,
did not empower the Board to determine
what economic sanctions are legally avail-
able to the parties in an ideal or balanced
state of collective bargaining.17
The Publishers' decision nevertheless
represents a considerable extension of the
Buffalo Linen Supply principle in that it
encompasses situations where the alleged
threat to the bargaining unit results, not
from a whipsaw strike, but from the possi-
bility of illegal walkouts in the future at the
plants of non-struck employers' association
1.1 Supra note 12, at 94-95.
15 Supra note 12, at 93 n.19.
16 NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361
U.S. 447 (1960).
17 Id. at 500.
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members. Consequently, the decision may
not be sustained on appeal.
In the past, the Board itself questionably
has refused to equate a lockout as an eco-
nomic weapon similar to the right of em-
ployees to strike. In a 1952 decision, the
Board bluntly expressed the "underdog"
rationale which helps to explain the Ameri-
can attitude toward strikes, at least those
strikes aimed at primary (as opposed to
secondary or neutral) employers by stating
"the Union has only one effective weapon
- its ancient and protected right to strike
.... [whereas the employer] has a whole
arsenal of weapons from which to choose."'"
Origin of
The Right to Strike
Judges, among them the late and re-
spected Learned Hand, have suggested that
the right to strike and to induce others to
do so and the right to bargain collectively
are derived from the common law.19 Per-
haps that is so. It is certainly true that the
traditional Anglo-Saxon repugnance for in-
voluntary servitude can be found in the
thirteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution, but those unionists who have
been imprisoned in this century in the
name of the common law may be somewhat
cynical of unqualified rhetoric about the
right to strike.
In the view of Sidney and Beatrice
Webb, the right to strike was always a
mere derivative of freedom of contract.'"
At the turn of the last century, the very
term "direct action" was unknown in Eng-
18 Davis Furniture Co., 100 N.L.R.B. 1016, 1020
(1952).
19 Douds v. Local 1250, Retail, Wholesale Dep't
Store Union, 173 F.2d 764, 770 (2d Cir. 1949).
20 WEBB & WEBB, TiE HISTORY OF TRADE UNION-
ISM 664 (1920).
land. The strike was regarded not as a dis-
tinct method of trade-union activity, but
merely as the culminating incident of a
breakdown in collective bargaining. Senator
Taft, during the 1947 legislative debates,
affirmed his belief in the right to strike as
a necessary element of the free enterprise
system.' We can find that right still guar-
anteed in Section 13 of the NLRA, except
as it has been limited by a number of other
Taft-sponsored amendments. This appar-
ent ambivalence is not reflected in the cau-
tious language of the Sinclair decision but
Mr. Justice Black, dissenting in another re-
cent case, expressed his views on the right
to strike more fully, stating that "to say
that the right to strike is inconsistent with
the contractual duty to arbitrate sounds
like a dull echo of the argument which used
to be so popular, that the right to strike was
inconsistent with the contractual duty to
work - an argument which frequently went
so far as to say that strikes are inconsistent
with both the common law and the Consti-
tution ."2.1
Anti-Strike Legislation
The Citizens' Union of New York City
and several of the daily newspapers re-
cently criticized the municipal government
for allegedly incorporating this uncritical
attitude toward strikes in an "anti-strike-
breaking" ordinance. The same civic offi-
cials have also been reluctant to enforce
the admittedly harsh provisions of the
21 92 CONG. REC. 5705 (daily ed. April 23, 1947).
22 61 Stat. 151 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1958).
This section has been interpreted as a congres-
sional command to the courts to resolve doubts
and ambiguities concerning unfair labor practices
by unions in favor of an interpretation which safe-
guards the right to strike. NLRB v. Teamsters
Union, 362 U.S. 274 (1960).
23 Local 174, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flower
Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
Condon-Wadlin Act24 against teachers who
struck the public schools, yet the Mayor
and other city officials seemed powerless,
until the intervention of Governor Rocke-
feller, to resolve the crisis of conscience
generated by the strike against some of
New York's voluntary hospitals in June
and July of 1962. The hospital strike re-
sulted from the efforts of a local of the
Retail, Wholesale Department Store Union
to seek recognition as the collective bar-
gaining representative of the nonprofes-
sional employees. The strike has been from
its inception a source of embarrassment to
organized labor as well as to the politicians.
The New York City union leaders, for the
most part old-line militants now represent-
ing a relatively prosperous rank and file,
apparently were shocked to learn that this
city does count the very poor among its
inhabitants. At first they supported the
strike on its merits and hailed the proposal
for compulsory arbitration legislation. Sev-
eral weeks later, however, the state AFL-
CIO, with only the Department Store
Union dissenting, emphatically rejected the
idea with the argument that such legislation
would open the door to compulsory arbi-
tration generally.
In September 1962, a strike by the Ameri-
can Federation of Television and Radio
Artists (AFTRA) blacked out New York
City's first educational television station on
its opening night. Whatever the merits of the
dispute, AFTRA's conduct in this case con-
stituted at best a brutal and unnecessary
demonstration of economic strength which
24 N.Y. Civ. SER. LAW § 108. "No person holding
a position by appointment or employment in the
government of the state of New York, or in the
government of the several cities, counties, towns or
villages thereof... shall strike." N.Y. CIV. SER.
LAW § 108(2).
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certainly made no friends for organized
labor. It is only fair to add, however, that a
double standard seems to prevail on the
question of strikes. Last summer, we wit-
nessed instances of direct action by the
medical profession which, in the opinion of
this writer, were more outrageous than any-
thing ever contemplated by organized labor.
Some doctors in New Jersey threatened to
strike against the medicare plan of the Ken-
nedy administration; most of the doctors in
the Saskatchewan Province of Canada did in
fact strike, obviously for other reasons. Yet
criticism of either group in responsible pub-
lications, when compared with the usual
reactions to a strike of milk deliverers, for
example, was surprisingly mild. Even ad-
verse criticism of the conduct of the Cana-
dian doctors was often tempered with the
curious assurance to readers that "emer-
gency" care was being provided during the
strike. Statistics may never be made avail-
able but the fallacy here becomes evident
when we consider the not-so-remote possi-
bility that a citizen or citizens of Saskatche-
wan might have died from cancer discovered
two weeks too late because at the time of the
first complaint, the patient's doctor was ex-
ercising his common-law right to strike.
Though not an "emergency" case ab initio,
the hypothetical patient died all the same.
Moral Attitudes
Two papal encyclicals, Rerum Novarum
(1891)25 and Quadragesimo Anno
(1931),26 which have had no little impact
upon social reforms in the United States and
other nations, are apropos of this discussion.
The late Philip Murray, first president of the
merged AFL-CIO, once referred to Rerum
25 Leo XIl1, Rerum Novarum (1891), FIVE GREAT
ENCYCLICALS 1 (1939).
26Pius X1, Quadragesimo Anno (1931), FIVE
GREAT ENCYCLICALS 125 (1939).
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Novarum as the "Magna Charta of labor's
rights. ' 27 Quadragesimo Anno figured
prominently in the Wagner Act legislative
debates. 23 Referring to both encyclicals,
G. Mennen Williams, while Governor of
Michigan in 1951, said in an address:
Today we do not question the fact the
issues of right and wrong must be considered
in our social policy along with questions of
profit and loss.... The voice of the Vatican
... was profoundly influential in bringing
the world to its senses. 29
The encyclicals nevertheless contain a
non-doctrinaire view of the right to strike.
Pope Leo XIII wrote that: "Religion teaches
the laboring man and the workman to carry
out honestly and well all equitable agee-
ments freely made . . . . 0 and that public
remedial measures should be utilized to re-
move the underlying causes of strikes "for
such paralysis of labor not only affects the
masters and their work-people, but is ex-
tremely injurious to trade and to the general
interests of the public. . . ."' Pope Pius XI,
in Quadragesimo Anno, suggested a system
of labor-management cooperation which
would abolish strikes (and lockouts) al-
together.'.2 The Jesuit priest, Benjamin L.
Masse, has interpreted Quadragesimo Anno
on this point to mean that the right to strike
is a natural right but one that can be exer-
cised legitimately only as a last resort, and
peaceably. 3 The papal teachings on labor
27 Oak, Social Encyclicals of the Pope, 49 CATH-
OLIC MIND 665, 667 (1951).
28 Hearings on the Operation of the Labor-Man-
agement Relations Act Before the Joint Commit-
tee on Labor-Management Relations, 80th Cong.,
2d Sess. 481, 491-92 (1947).
29Williams, Not Statism, Not Socialism, 49
CATHOLIC MIND 660, 661 (1951).
30 Leo XIII, supra note 25, para. 16.
31 Leo XII, supra note 25, para. 31.
32 See Pius XI, supra note 26, para. 94.
33 Masse, The Popes and the Industrial Revolu-
tion, 49 CATHOLIC MIND 635, 640 (1951).
have always stressed a comprehensive view
of social justice and the need to relate par-
ticular applications of the teachings to the
community as a whole. 4
If, as suggested above, the right to strike
has its American origins in the common
law, there is substantial evidence that it has
developed along radically different lines in
other nations, including England. The Brit-
ish historians, Sidney and Beatrice Webb,
noted in 1920 a growing tendency among
British labor unions to abandon the strike,
even as a collective bargaining weapon, in
favor of political action.3 A 1960 study by
Professors Paul Hartman and Arthur Ross
of the Institute of Industrial Relations in
California concluded that only in the United
States and Canada is the strike still an essen-
tial element in a non-regulated collective
bargaining system "sufficiently frequent as
to constitute a significant method of deter-
mining conditions of employment and suffi-
ciently long as to test the staying power of
workers and employers." It is startling to
learn that in 1958 and 1959 the average
annual work loss due to strikes exceeded
two days per union member only in India,
Finland and the United States. Excluding
the totalitarian countries from consideration
in this respect, Hartman and Ross seem to
attribute the discrepancy to an almost
world-wide tendency among unionists to
favor broad political endeavors as a means
of remedying industrial grievances rather
than strikes.
Alternatives
We need not conclude from all this that
the right to strike is, or shoud be, obsolete.
4 Baerwald, The Labor Encyclicals Today, 49
CATHOLIC MIND 622, 629 (1951).
35 WEBB & WEBB, THE HISTORY OF TRADE UNION-
Ism 664 (1920).
Proposed alternatives which have been suc-
cessful in other nations, such as compulsory
arbitration and the formation of a Labor
Party, might prove unworkable here and
even obnoxious to the American eco-politi-
cal system. It is also true that in this country
most employers will never welcome unions
with open arms and in the last analysis,
despite the protections and prohibitions of
the federal and state labor statutes, unions,
in most cases, will be forced to resort to a
show of economic strength to force recogni-
tion and/or just bargaining demands upon
recalcitrant employers. But the point sought
to be made here is that the right to strike is
by no means absolute. A democratic desire
to sympathize with the "underdog" should
not obscure the fact that the entire commu-
nity, including employers, has a legitimate
interest in industrial peace.
Mr. Justice Brennan argued in his vigor-
ous dissenting opinion in the Sinclair case
that the justification for the Norris-LaGuar-
dia Act in 1932 was that federal court
injunctions had stripped unions of their
strike weapon without substituting any rea-
sonable alternative. However, an agreement,
freely made, to arbitrate all disputes arising
during the term of the contract obviously
does offer such an alternative.
Ironically enough, the Sinclair decision
will also add to the woes of many harassed
union leaders. It is unfortunate but true that
those labor organizations which are most
democratic in their internal affairs are often
most guilty of illegal strike activities; either
the leaders cannot control dissident ele-
ments in the ranks or, facing re-election dif-
ficulties, must cater to the desire of the
members for dramatic action to protest real
or imagined grievance. In the past, the
threat of an imminent injunction has been
urged when necessary by union officials,
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without losing face, as a compelling reason
for resorting to arbitration rather than a
work stoppage for satisfaction of the griev-
ance.
It is quite likely that in the next few years,
Congress will avoid the effect of the Sinclair
decision by either amending the venerable
Norris-LaGuardia Act or, more likely, by
amending the NLRA to make an unjustified
breach of a no strike clause an unfair labor
practice, enjoinable at the discretion of the
NLRB. In certain vital industries or occu-
pations, compulsory arbitration may be the
necessary alternative to strikes of any kind.
Teachers and hospital workers, for example,
who in effect are denied the right to strike
under all circumstances, should not be
forced to rely solely on the generosity or
political sensibilities of public officials for
redress.
But the larger problem will still remain
and that is the failure of some unionists,
particularly in industries like construction
where labor organizations are enormously
powerful, to comprehend that employers
who can afford a wage demand should not
automatically and in every instance be com-
pelled to pay it. Perhaps a more cogent ex-
ample of union callousness is the not
infrequent jurisdictional or work-assignment
dispute in which the employer is usually an
innocent bystander. Several years ago, the
writer had occasion to become involved in
such a controversy which could fairly be
described as the result of pique on the part
of one of the competing unions, but which
threatened to halt construction on a down-
town New York City skyscraper. The owner
of the building quickly capitulated to the
more powerful of the two unions because
even a two-day strike might have cost him
thousands of dollars in broken leases.
(Continued on page 119)
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even though the new physical state was ob-
tained by the use of nonjuridical means.
The party should, therefore, be allowed
to enter into a licit and valid marriage con-
tract. The example above cited is, in our
estimation, one of the cases which clearly
illustrates the absolute independence of
law from medical science.
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(Continued)
Employers in certain industries almost
always bow to union demands because, hav-
ing banded together in collective bargaining
associations with their competitors, they are
in a position to make the public pay the
price of increased wages or shorter hours.
This is an oversimplification, of course, but
it would not be naive not to suppose, for
example, that at least one effect of the
inflated wage scales in the building trades is
to make it more difficult for the lower-
income groups to increase their earnings
and someday to buy a home.
Conclusion
In any 'event, it would appear that gov-
ernment neutrality in labor disputes is fast
becoming a thing of the past. The Kennedy
administration has to date shown no reluct-
ance to invoke the Taft-Hartley injunction
procedures in labor disputes affecting the
national welfare. A proposal by former
Secretary of Labor Goldberg that govern-
ment representatives participate as "observ-
ers" in major negotiations was greeted with
a cry of indignation from George Meaney
and a chilly "no thanks" from management
spokesmen, but Goldberg's proposal does
reflect an increasing concern for the public
interest in labor-management disputes. It
seems that government mediators often will
intervene in disputes that only remotely
affect national defense interests. Perhaps
this tendency has been influenced by the
widely-held view among labor practitioners
that public tolerance for strikes is much
lower today than during the years when
unions were organizing in the mass produc-
tion industries.3 6
In conclusion, it is safe to say that addi-
tional legislation to curb illegal strikes and
to compel arbitration in certain industries
may not only be inevitable but necessary as
well. We also can expect government regu-
lation over other areas of collective bargain-
ing unless the powerful unions pay heed to
the principle enunciated by Pope Pius XI in
Quadragesimo Anno that the right to strike
should be exercised only as a last resort and
in situations where it needs no justification.
:; N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1962, p. 48, col. 2.
